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Abstract
We propose a mean field game model to study the question of how centralization
of reward and computational power occur in the Bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies. Min-
ers compete against each other for mining rewards by increasing their computational
power. This leads to a novel mean field game of jump intensity control, which we
solve explicitly for miners maximizing exponential utility, and handle numerically in
the case of miners with power utilities. We show that the heterogeneity of their initial
wealth distribution leads to greater imbalance of the reward distribution, or a “rich get
richer” effect. This concentration phenomenon is aggravated by a higher bitcoin price,
and reduced by competition. Additionally, an advanced miner with cost advantages
such as access to cheaper electricity, contributes a significant amount of computational
power in equilibrium. Hence, cost efficiency can also result in the type of centralization
seen among miners of cryptocurrencies.
1 Introduction
Blockchain technologies serve the purpose of record keeping in a decentralized way. Bit-
coin is the famous realization of this idea (see Nakamoto (2008)). Since its creation in
January 2009, Bitcoin has grown rapidly. The supply of bitcoins is constantly growing, but
limited to 21 million, of which more than 17 million are in circulation now.
In the Bitcoin network, independent “miners” compete for the right to record the next
transaction block on the blockchain. They follow proof-of-work protocol and solve math
puzzles. Once a miner obtains a solution, the corresponding block is added on top of the
blockchain and the miner obtains the reward. The math puzzle is designed such that there is
no known better way of solving it than brute force calculation. In other words, the chance of
getting the reward is proportional to the computational power or the hash rates that miners
can provide. Moreover, the difficulty of the puzzle varies to maintain a consistent solving
time, for example 10 minutes. To be specific, if miners can solve the problem in 8 minutes,
the system will make the problem harder so that the average time goes back to 10 minutes.
In summary, the two important properties are that (1) the probability of obtaining the next
reward is proportional to computational efforts and (2) the block rewards appear with a fixed
average frequency.
∗ORFE Department, Princeton University, Princeton, USA.
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Bitcoin is a payment system maintained by a peer-to-peer network. The miners are ac-
tually individuals who are dispersed all over the world. They record transactions on the
blockchain and achieve the decentralization of the payment system. However, miners have
incentives to maximize their own utility. To achieve this, they may increase their compu-
tational power to compete for the reward, which can lead to the imbalance of the reward
distribution. The empirical analysis in Kondor et al. (2014) shows that the accumulation of
bitcoins tends to occur among a small amount of miners, which suggests the centralization of
the reward. This raises the following questions: What is the best strategy for miners to max-
imize their interests? How does the centralization of the reward happen in a decentralized
mining activity. What factors have impact on this centralization?
At the end of 2010, the first mining pool “Slush pool” was announced. Miners can join
the pool, which collects their computational power to do the mining. Once the pool gets
the reward, miners share the profit within it. Nowadays, most computational power comes
from mining pools that are controlled by a few companies (see Figure 5). For instance,
AntPool and BTC.com are run by Bitmain. Meanwhile, these companies also contribute a
significant proportion of hash rates in their own pools. That means a few miners account for
a large amount of hash rates in the world. One may ask: What leads to this centralization
of computational power? What advantages do those miners have?
1.1 Related literature
Our work is related to the growing literature on cryptocurrencies. A game-theoretic
model is developed in Easley et al. (2019) to show the emergence of transaction fees in the
Bitcoin payment system. Abadi and Brunnermeier (2018) point out the blockchain trilemma,
and analyze when decentralized record-keeping is economically beneficial. Sockin and Xiong
(2018) explore a model to study initial coin offerings for new decentralized digital platforms.
Cong and He (2019) argue that the blockchain facilitates the creation of smart contracts,
which can sustain market equilibria with a larger range of economic outcomes. Biais et al.
(2019) use a stochastic game to show that the proof-of-work protocol results in multiple
equilibria, some of which can lead to persistent divergence between chains. A revenue man-
agement problem in the context of bitcoin selling is studied in Dai et al. (2019). Our work
differs from these studies in that we analyze centralization of the reward and computational
power in mining activities as well as how price and competition impact it.
Our work is most closely related to recent literature on miners’ strategic behavior and the
centralization of mining. Cong et al. (2019) examine mining pools, and unexpected impacts
of their risk sharing, such as the concentration of the mining power. Arnosti and Weinberg
(2018) consider asymmetric costs among miners and show that lower cost leads to higher
market share. On the other hand, Alsabah and Capponi (2019) explore a two-stage mining
game consisting of research and development and then competition. They explain how
the arms race leads to asymmetric costs and mining centralization. Different from these
static games, our work considers continuous mean field games, incorporating dynamic change
of miners’ wealth and decisions over time. We refer to Gue´ant et al. (2011) for an early
introductory exposition on mean field games.
Our work also contributes to the literature on intensity control of jump processes. It is
used in the model for exploration of natural resources. Deshmukh and Pliska (1980) and
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Arrow and Chang (1982) study the optimal consumption rule of a natural resource. They
use a point process to model the uncertainty of the discoveries for new sources of supply,
where the control is exploration effort. Later on, Soner (1985) considered a similar model
with holding cost, and established the existence and uniqueness of solution to the Bellman
equation. Intensity control models are also used in revenue management and dynamic pricing.
A buffer flow system with jumps is considered by Li (1988), where the cumulative production
and demand are modeled by two counting processes, with intensity controlled by production
capacity and price. In addition, Gallego and van Ryzin (1994, 1997) model dynamic pricing
for inventories of products. The demand for those is modeled as point processes and the
intensities are controlled by setting prices. In our work, the jump process is used to represent
the acquisition of the reward. The miners control the jump intensity through adjusting their
computational power or hash rates. This model approach is natural due to the two important
properties of Bitcoin payment system mentioned before.
There has been recent work on games of intensity control. For instance, Ludkovski and Sircar
(2012) consider the effects of stochastic resource exploration in dynamic Cournot game,
where an exhaustible producer and a green producer set the production to affect the price.
Gallego and Hu (2014) study dynamic pricing in an oligopolistic market. Each firm com-
petes to sell its product and the equilibrium strategies and prices are resolved. In a mean
field game setting, Chan and Sircar (2017) examine the impact of oil discovery, concluding
that higher reserves lead to lower exploration. There the players’ interaction was through
producers’ oil extraction rates. In this paper, different from most works in the literature, the
mean field interaction is through the players’ intensities, or hash rates.
1.2 Mean field game model
To study the centralization of mining rewards, we formalize a mean field game model,
where each miner is characterized by its wealth, and chooses its hash rate to maximize
expected utility at a fixed time horizon. Its wealth changes because of the mining rewards
and expenses. The instantaneous probability of receiving the reward is
pl. i’s hash rate
total hash rate
=
pl. i’s hash rate
#players × mean hash rate
=
pl. i’s hash rate
pl. i’s hash rate+ (#players −1) × mean hash rate
.
In order to utilize computational advantages of mean field games technology, our model
replaces the second term in the denominator by (M × continuum mean hash rate), where
M + 1 represents the actual total number of miners, and is large. This implies that the
mean field interaction is strong, whereas often in the literature it is assumed to be small for
computational and technical reasons. We argue that for cryptocurrency problems, interaction
with the total hash rate is essential in a realistic model. Indeed, this does introduce numerical
difficulties, for which we provide an effective algorithm in Section 2.3.1.
For mining without liquidity constraints, we find the equilibrium explicitly under expo-
nential utility, whereas with liquidity constraints we solve the equilibrium numerically with
power utility. It is suggested by the model that heterogeneity of the initial wealth distri-
bution among miners results in greater concentration of wealth over time, or “the rich get
richer”. In other words, the miner with more wealth contributes more hash rate and thus
has a higher probability of getting the next reward. It is also illustrated that the price of
bitcoin can foster this centralization, while competition can reduce it.
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In an extended model, we consider an advanced miner with cost advantages in the mean
field game model. There are three main features distinguishing it from other miners. First,
it is cost efficient. This could be due to having access to cheaper electricity or advanced
equipment. Second, the advanced miner is risk neutral and maximizes running profit over
time instead of terminal utility. Lastly, its hash rate affects the probability for the represen-
tative miner of getting the reward. But the representative miner only affects the advanced
miner through the mean field. The model shows that the advanced miner can account for a
significant amount of the total hash rate. Other miners become less active when the cost of
the advanced miner decreases. Hence, cost efficiency is a factor leading to the centralization
of mining power.
2 Competition among homogeneous miners
We begin by describing the general structure of both the individual’s mining problem
and the subsequent equilibrium. This structure is then used in the study of mining, first
without liquidity constraints, and thereafter with.
2.1 General structure of the mining problem
We consider a continuum of miners who competitively engage in Bitcoin mining over
some finite time period [t0, T ]. The miners have initial wealth x ∈ R, distributed at time t0
according to an initial density function m0. The representative miner provides hash rate αt,
incurring a linear cost per unit of time cαt, where c > 0, and t ∈ [t0, T ]. This is interpreted
as the cost of electricity, and is thus proportional to their hash rates. It can also be thought
of as encompassing any other linear cost, but for simplicity we disregard the possibility of
nonlinear costs. In particular, the cost of mining equipment is linear in equipment, but not
in the mining rate.
There are two important features of the Bitcoin proof-of-work protocol: First, the system
always generates a reward on an almost fixed frequency that does not depend on the total
hash rate. In fact, the system will adjust the difficulty to make a reward available every 10
minutes on average. So it is reasonable to model the total number of rewards in the system as
a whole as a Poisson process with a constant intensity D > 0. Second, a miner’s probability
of receiving the next mining reward is proportional to the ratio of its hash rate to that of
the population. Since the math puzzle needs to be solved by brute force, the more hash rate
a miner contributes, the more likely it will obtain the reward.
The number of rewards each miner can receive is modelled by a counting process Nt with
jump intensity λt > 0.
1 Let M + 1 be the total number of miners and α¯t denote the mean
hash rate across all miners. Here, our model for the reward intensity as a function of an
individual’s hash rate αt and the mean hash rate is
λt :=
αt
D(αt +Mα¯t)
,
and we use Mα¯t to approximate the total hash rate of other miners.
1Formally, P [Nt+∆t −Nt = 1] = λt∆t+ o(∆t) and P [Nt+∆t −Nt ≥ 2] = o(∆t), see Bre´maud (1981).
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Each miner is considered small and has negligible impact on the population’s mean pro-
duction. To model the behavior of each individual miner, let α¯ = (α¯t)t≥t0 be a given process
describing the mean production, where t0 ≥ 0 is the initial time. Then, the miner’s wealth
process Xt follows
dXt = −cαt dt+ p dNt, (2.1)
where p is the value of the mining reward.
The value of each reward is the product of the bitcoin prince p and its quantity.2 Since
our focus is on the strategic decision of miners and the centralization in the competition,
we treat the price as a constant. The number of bitcoins as a reward is set to decrease
geometrically with 50% reduction every 4 years approximately. Currently, a miner can be
rewarded by 12.50 bitcoins if it adds the next block successfully. We do not distinguish
between the value of the reward and the price of bitcoin since the quantity generated each
time is fixed over four years.
2.1.1 The miner’s problem
Suppose that α = (αt)t≥t0 is a Markovian control. The process α can then be associated
with a function (t, Xt) 7→ α(t, Xt; α¯) of the current state. We call a control admissible if
α(t, x; α¯) ∈ [0, A(x)], for a given non-decreasing function A : R → [0,+∞]. The function
A(x) is part of the problem specification and should be thought of as encoding the liquidity
constraints of each miner.3 For instance, a liquidity constraint will later be imposed by
requiring mining to cease when X drops to zero. This is encoded as A(0) = 0.
With such controls, the wealth process X is a Markov process. The objective of the
representative miner is to maximize the expected utility at fixed terminal time T . We
assume the utility function U is strictly increasing and concave. The objective function is
written as
v(t0, x; α¯) = sup
α
E[U(XT )|Xt0 = x], (2.2)
where we emphasize that XT depends on α and α¯ through the cost and N .
Lemma 2.1. Fix a choice of α¯ > 0. For any time t ∈ [t0, T ], the value function v(t, x; α¯) is
finite and strictly increasing in the wealth x.
This lemma is standard, because more wealth gives more flexibility to miners to choose
their hash rates. It will be useful in the following derivation.
For a fixed mean hash rate α¯ > 0, we first write down the HJB
∂tv + sup
α∈[0,A(x)]
(
−cα∂xv +
α
D(α+Mα¯t)
∆v
)
= 0, (2.3)
2The miners are also rewarded the transaction fees in successfully mined blocks. This is paid in units of
bitcoins. The transaction fees usually account for small proportion of the total reward, so, as our focus is
not on the structure of the reward, we do not consider these fees in our model.
3It could also encode constraints on the hardware capacity or access to electricity. However, this paper
will focus on financial liquidity constraint.
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with terminal condition v(T, x) = U(x), and where ∆v = v(t, x+p; α¯)−v(t, x; α¯). By Lemma
2.1, ∆v > 0 and ∂xv > 0, and so the optimal hash rate is given by
α∗(t, x; α¯) =


min

−Mα¯t +
√√√√Mα¯t∆v(t, x; α¯)
Dc∂xv(t, x; α¯)
, A(x)

 , if α¯t < ∆v(t, x; α¯)MDc∂xv(t, x; α¯) ,
0, otherwise.
(2.4)
If A(x) is sufficiently large, the HJB equation can be simplified as


∂tv +

√Mcα¯t∂xv −
√
∆v
D


2
= 0, if α¯t <
∆v
MDc∂xv
,
∂tv = 0, otherwise.
(2.5)
2.1.2 Equilibrium characterization
The continuum of miners are labelled by their wealth x. Let α∗(t, x; α¯) be the optimal
hash rate of miner x, and denote by m(t, x; α¯) the resulting density of the miners’ wealth as
a function of time and wealth. We say α¯∗ forms an equilibrium mean hash rate of the mining
game if
α¯∗t =
∫
R
α∗(t, x; α¯∗)m(t, x; α¯∗)dx, ∀t ∈ [t0, T ].
Henceforth, let α¯∗ denote an equilibrium mean hash rate, and denote
v(t, x) = v(t, x; α¯∗), α∗(t, x) = α∗(t, x; α¯∗), m(t, x) = m(t, x; α¯∗).
We will assume that α¯∗t 6= 0 for all t for the following reason. If α¯
∗
t = 0, then each miner
has an admissible control that dominates the choice of not mining, provided some non-zero
control is admissible. Hence, unless the mass of miners with non-zero admissible controls is
zero, some mining will always occur.
We assume the initial density m0(x) is continuously differentiable and satisfies∫
R≥0
m0(x)dx = 1. (2.6)
That is, each miner starts with nonnegative, finite wealth.
In the equilibrium, if A(x) is sufficiently large,
α¯∗t =
∫
Et
α∗(t, x)m(t, x)dx = −Mη(t)α¯∗t +
√
Mα¯∗t
Dc
∫
Et
√√√√∆v(t, x)
∂xv(t, x)
m(t, x)dx,
where
Et = {x : α
∗(t, x) > 0} (2.7)
denotes the wealth level on which the miners are active and
η(t) =
∫
Et
m(t, x)dx
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denotes the fraction of active miners. Thus,
α¯∗t =
M
(1 +Mη(t))2

∫
Et
√√√√ ∆v(t, x)
Dc∂xv(t, x)
m(t, x)dx


2
, (2.8)
and the Fokker-Planck equation is given by
∂tm− ∂x(cα
∗(t, x)m)−
1
D
(
α∗(t, x− p)
α∗(t, x− p) +Mα¯∗t
m(t, x− p)−
α∗(t, x)
α∗(t, x) +Mα¯∗t
m(t, x)
)
= 0,
(2.9)
with initial distribution m(t0, x) = m0(x).
2.2 Exponential utility and mining without liquidity constraints
In the model of unconstrained liquidity, a miner’s wealth Xt can take negative values by
means of interest-free borrowing. This means that miners can continue their mining activity
even if they would otherwise be ruined, i.e., A(·) ≡ ∞. This may not be true in reality,
but it shows us the fundamental structure of the mining problem on which we build more
reasonable models later on.
The above analysis in Section 2.1 does not make any specific assumption on the utility
function. In general, the model can only be solved numerically to find the equilibrium fixed
point. However, with exponential utility, we are able to find the solution explicitly.
Proposition 2.2. With exponential utility U(x) = − 1
γ
e−γx (γ > 0, x ∈ R), in the equilib-
rium, all miners are always active, with constant hash rate
α∗(t, x) ≡ α¯∗t ≡
M
(1 +M)2
1− e−γp
Dcγ
, (2.10)
and their individual reward rate is
λt ≡
1
D(1 +M)
,
for any t ∈ [t0, T ] and x ∈ R. The value function is given by
v(t, x) = U(x)e
−
1−e−γp
D(1+M)2
(T−t)
. (2.11)
Proof. We guess the form v(t, x) = U(x)h(t) and then the HJB equation (2.5) becomes

∂th− γ
(√
Mcα¯∗t −
√
1− e−γp
Dγ
)2
h = 0, if α¯∗t <
1− e−γp
MDcγ
,
∂th = 0, otherwise,
with terminal condition h(T ) = 1. It is an equation involving t only, which validates our
ansatz. On the other hand, this ansatz implies that ∆v/∂xv does not depend on x. Hence,
by (2.8),
α¯∗t =
η2M
(1 + ηM)2
∆v
Dc∂xv
≤
M
(1 +M)2
∆v
Dc∂xv
<
∆v
MDc∂xv
,
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which means all miners are active and η ≡ 1.
The equilibrium mean hash rate is obtained from plugging in the ansatz into (2.8). There-
after, (2.4) yields (2.10). The value function then satisfies
∂th−
1
(1 +M)2
1− e−γp
D
h = 0,
with terminal condition h(T ) = 1. Thus we have (2.11).
Risk-Reward Analysis
As α∗ is constant, we drop the dependence on t and x. In the equilibrium, the wealth of
the representative miner can be written as
Xt0+t = Xt0 − cα
∗t+ p(N∗t0+t −N
∗
t0
) = Xt0 −
M
(1 +M)2
1− e−γp
γD
t+ p(N∗t0+t −N
∗
t0
),
where N∗ has the jump rate λt =
1
D(1+M)
. Then we can get the expectation and variance of
Xt0+t,
E[Xt0+t] = E[Xt0 ] +
(
p−
M
1 +M
1− e−γp
γ
)
t
D(1 +M)
,
Var(Xt0+t) = Var(Xt0) +
p2t
D(1 +M)
.
Using that 0 < 1−e
−γp
γ
≤ p, the expected wealth change E[Xt0+t −Xt0 ] satisfies
pt
D(1 +M)
> E[Xt0+t −Xt0 ] ≥
pt
D(1 +M)2
≥ 0.
In above expressions, we can identify two sources of risk. The first is the price of bit-
coin. The expected wealth grows linearly in the price of bitcoin, but the variance increases
quadratically. This indicates that a price increase adversely affects the risk relative to the
reward. Although with high prices p, mining can bring considerable rewards, the potential
loss is greater.
The second source of risk is competition. If γp is very small, the expected wealth incre-
ment is discounted by (M + 1)2. However, the variance is only discounted by a linear factor
(M + 1). Hence, as more miners join the game, the expected gain shrinks very fast, but the
potential risk decreases slowly. We notice that
P [N∗t0+t −N
∗
t0
= 0] = e−
t
D(1+M) .
In fact, as the number of miners grows, the probability of getting no new bitcoin approaches
1. This reflects that the competition reduces the chance of getting the reward.
The optimal hash rate in (2.10) is increasing in the price and decreasing in the number
of miners. That is, a larger reward inspires miners to hash faster, whereas competition
diminishes the value of their efforts. For each M and p, α∗t ≤
1
cγ(1+M)D
, which shows that
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miners do not increase their hash rates arbitrarily. It is also worth noting that the social
cost (M + 1)cα∗ has an upper bound (M + 1)cα∗ < 1
Dγ
. In other words, this is an upper
bound for the total cost paid by all miners.
It is also interesting to see that the optimal hash rate does not depend on individual
wealth. This is because miners can keep mining even with negative wealth. In the next
section, we present a model where miners with negative wealth are instead eliminated from
the mining game.
2.3 Liquidity-constrained mining and utilities on R≥0
In this section, we consider the mining problem where miners have constrained liquidity,
and utility functions U defined on R≥0, satisfying U(0) > −∞, U
′(0+) =∞, and U ′(∞) = 0.
In particular, miners face ruin when their wealth falls to zero. This means that a miner
with zero wealth does not have the resources to pay for electricity and other expenses, and
is therefore not able to mine at all. We encode this restriction by letting
A(0) = 0 (equivalently, α∗(t, 0) ≡ 0) and A(x) =∞ for x > 0.
As argued in Section 2.1.2, we assume that α¯∗ 6= 0. Thus, with this choice of A, solving
the problem (2.2), we reach the equation (2.5) for x > 0 with the boundary condition
v(t, 0) = U(0). (2.12)
This condition reflects that miners cease their mining if they are without wealth, i.e., they
are out of the game once their wealth hits 0. Note that the wealth of a miner that starts
with non-negative wealth will remain non-negative. Recall from (2.6) that the initial density
has non-negative support. This means that the problem is fully characterized on R≥0.
In contrast to the problem of Section 2.2, with the boundary condition (2.12), the value
function cannot be found explicitly, even with power utility, so we must solve (2.5) numeri-
cally. Nevertheless, the mean hash rate is still given by (2.8). However, the Fokker–Planck
equation has two parts to account for the boundary condition. The density m solves (2.9)
(at least in a weak sense) for x > p. On the other hand, if 0 < x < p, there is no density
at x − p jumping to x, because no miners are active with negative wealth. Thus, for the
optimal individual hash rate
α∗ = α∗(t, x) = −Mα¯t +
√√√√Mα¯t∆v(t, x; α¯)
Dc∂xv(t, x; α¯)
and for 0 < x < p, the density m solves
∂tm− ∂x(cα
∗m) +
α∗
D(α∗ +Mα¯∗)
m = 0, (2.13)
with initial condition m(t0, x) = m0(x).
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Remark 2.3. The Fokker–Planck equation can be verified to preserve mass on R≥0, i.e., for
all t ∈ [t0, T ],
∫
R≥0
m(t, x)dx = 1. Indeed,
∂t
∫
R≥0
m(t, x)dx =
∫
R≥0
∂tm(t, x)dx,
= cα∗(t, ·)m(t, ·)|p0 −
∫ +∞
0
α∗
D(α∗ +Mα¯∗t )
mdx+ cα∗(t, ·)m(t, ·)|+∞p
−
∫ +∞
p
α∗(t, x− p)
D(α∗(t, x− p) +Mα¯∗t )
m(t, x− p)dx,
= cα∗(t, ·)m(t, ·)|+∞0 = 0.
The last equation holds because no one can obtain infinite wealth in finite time, and the
condition α∗(t, 0) = 0 holds.
2.3.1 Numerical method
The method we use to numerically find an equilibrium is as follows. First, we solve
both the nonlinear HJB equation (2.3) with (2.12) for some mean hash rate. Then, we use
the optimal control and the Fokker–Planck equation to find the evolution of the population
density. With these two solutions, we calculate the corresponding mean hash rate and repeat
the process until convergence. This procedure is described in greater detail below.
1. Initialize with a mean hash rate t 7→ α¯t, for instance a constant.
2. Solve for the value function and control:
Given α∗, (2.3) is a linear PDE that can be solved by standard methods. We thus
begin by approximating α∗, starting at time T .
At time T , the value function is v known, so (2.4) yields α∗(T, x; α¯). This value is then
used as an approximation of α∗(T − dt, x; α¯), which allows us to solve for v at T − dt,
using the HJB:
∂tv +
(
−cα∗(T, x; α¯)∂xv +
α∗(T, x; α¯)
D(α∗(T, x; α¯) +Mα¯T )
∆v
)
= 0.
The ∆v term is calculated explicitly using v(T, x + p; α¯) − v(T, x; α¯), while the other
part is discretized by an implicit finite difference scheme. With the value function v
at T − dt, we can get α∗(T − dt, x; α¯). Repeat such time steps backwards until t = 0.
This yields both functions v and α∗.
3. The next step is to solve the Fokker–Planck equation and get the mean field control.
The α∗(t, x; α¯) is obtained from the previous step allows us to solve for m(t, x) using
(2.9) and (2.13). In doing so, the following parts are discretized by an implicit finite
difference scheme
∂tm− ∂x(cα
∗(t, x)m) +
α∗(t, x)
D(α∗(t, x) +Mα¯t)
m,
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while m in
−
1
D
α∗(t, x− p)
α∗(t, x− p) +Mα¯t
m(t, x− p)
is evaluated in the previous time step.
4. To reduce oscillations in searching for the equilibrium, we introduce a parameter of
inertia, w ∈ [0, 1). At each time t, we update the mean hash rate according to
α¯newt = wα¯t + (1− w)
∫
R
α∗(t, x; α¯)m(t, x; α¯)dx.
The choice of w has no impact on the equilibrium fixed point.
Finally, repeat from the first step with α¯ = α¯new until convergence.
Because of the destabilizing effect ofM ≫ 1, we use w = 1− 1
M
. This yields stable iterations
at the expense of slower convergence. The choice has been successful for all figures presented
here, but experiments have shown that faster choices, i.e., smaller w sometimes also works.
2.3.2 Concentration of wealth and mining effort
In this section, we numerically solve for the equilibrium with liquidity constraints and
for utility functions of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), also known as power utility.
That is,
U(x) =
1
1− γ
x1−γ for γ > 0, γ 6= 1. (2.14)
This structure of liquidity constraints and CRRA utility leads to strategic decisions of
the miners that are very different from those without liquidity constraints. When taking
illiquidity into consideration, those with larger wealth tend to hash more. This results in a
phenomenon called preferential attachment, or the rich get richer, which means that those
who have more also receive more.
Preferential attachment happens in many situations: scientific citation networks (Baraba´si et al.,
2002), language use (Perc, 2012), distribution of cities by population and distributions of in-
comes by size (Simon, 1955). A recent study points out that it also appears in the Bitcoin
network (Kondor et al., 2014). It states that “we find that the wealth of already rich nodes
increases faster than the wealth of nodes with low balance.” Our numerical results show that
the heterogeneity in miners’ wealth leads to this phenomenon.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the miners’ wealth at t = 30, 45, 60, 90 compared with
the initial distribution. As time increases, the majority of the mass moves to the left, forming
a big spike gradually. At the same time, there is small part of the mass moving to the right.
This indicates that most miners lose their wealth, but those who have relatively more money
originally accumulate wealth over time.
Figure 2(a) shows the expected instantaneous profit, namely,
−cα∗(t, x) +
p
D
α∗(t, x)
α∗(t, x) +Mα¯∗t
.
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Figure 1: The distribution of miners’ wealth at different times. Parameters: D = 0.007,
p = 3, c = 2× 10−5, T = 90, γ = 0.8, M = 1000. The initial distribution m0 is normal
with mean 90 and standard deviation 5.
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Figure 2: The left plot shows the expected instantaneous profit miners at different
wealth levels and times. The right one gives the proportion of miners with wealth over
100 and their share of the total instantaneous profits. Parameters are the same as
Figure 1.
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This shows that the more wealth a miner has, the higher is the reward it receives. Miners
with lower wealth worry more about ruin, and thus they hash at lower rates or even zero
rate. This pattern holds at all times. In addition, it is interesting to see that the miners
are blocked (0 hash rate) around and below wealth level 80 (see Figure 2(a)). The risk
aversion prevents miners with small wealth from participating in the mining game. This is
summarized by the following lemma. Its proof is provided in the appendix.
Lemma 2.4. For any time t and equilibrium hash rate α¯∗t > 0, there exists xb(t) > 0 such
that zero rate mining is optimal, i.e., α∗(t, x) = 0 for x ≤ xb(t).
Moreover, we calculate the proportion of miners whose wealth is over 100 and their their
share of the instantaneous profits, both of which are shown in Figure 2(b). The proportion
increases from around 2% to 18%, while the share of profits rises from 4% to 41%. Hence,
as time goes by, the wealthy receive an increasingly large share of the profits.
We have shown“the rich get richer”phenomenon in the mining game. It is also interesting
to see how the price p and competition parameter M affect this phenomenon, as these two
are the sources of risk mentioned in Section 2.2. To avoid repetition, we show only the plots
at t = 30, but a similar pattern is present also at other times.
A larger price p exacerbates the degree of preferential attachment. The density plots
in Figure 3 show that those with lower wealth tend to lose money faster when the price is
higher. At the same time, the density for x ≥ 110 is clearly higher for the larger price in
Figure 3 (a)(b)(c). Figure 3(d) show the expected instantaneous profit, which leads to the
same conclusion.
The competition parameter M reduces the preferential attachment. In Figure 4 (a)(b)(c)
this shown, as the density for x ≥ 100 is lower for larger M . Additionally, the hash rate
and the profit decrease with respect to M , as is show in Figure 4(d). Meanwhile, as the
competition becomes fierce and the entry level for the game is larger. When M = 1000,
miners need wealth around 75 to enter the game, but this increases to about 90 forM = 10000.
Hence, the competition makes the mining less lucrative and makes it harder for miners to
stay active, which reduces the preferential attachment.
3 Competition with cost advantages
In this section, we consider a model in which a miner can have cost advantages over the
rest. This could be due to access to cheaper energy or more advanced equipment, and helps
the miner become dominant in the mining game. Bitmain is one example of an advantageous
miner. It takes advantage of the cheaper electricity in China, like the hydropower stations
in Sichuan during the rainy season, and also of its expansion overseas, like Hydro Quebec
in Canada, which offers some of the lowest electricity rates in North America.4 The model
studied in this section suggests that cost advantages can be a contributing factor in the
centralization observed in Bitcoin mining, which is dominated by a few large entities, as is
illustrated in Figure 5.
4https://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-bitcoin-china/chinese-bitcoin-miners-eye-sites-in-energy-rich-canada-idUSKBN1F10BU
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Figure 3: The price effects at t = 30. The first three plots show the distribution
of miners’ wealth. The last one shows the expected instantaneous profit of miners at
different wealth levels, for four different price levels. Parameters are the same as Figure
1 except that p takes multiple values.
3.1 The cost-advantaged miner problem
We consider a cost-advantaged miner, competing withM+1 individual miners introduced
in Section 2.1.5 This miner chooses its hash rate βt, with the corresponding cost c1βt = kccβt,
where 0 < kc ≤ 1 is the relative cost efficiency. Given the mean hash rate α¯t of individual
miners, let the counting process N1t with intensity
λ1t =
βt
D(βt + (M + 1)α¯t)
denote the number of rewards received by the advanced miner.
We assume that the advanced miner is wealthy and therefore not liquidity constrained.
Moreover, for simplicity, it is also risk neutral and it aims to maximize its running profit.
5This type of competition between an individual and a continuum of payers is related to so-called major-
minor mean field games, see e.g. Huang (2010). However, the introduction of our parameter M to approxi-
mate an aggregate in terms of a mean implies that the so-called minor players are not really minor.
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Figure 4: The competition effects at t = 30. The first three plots show the distribution
of miners’ wealth. The last one shows the expected instantaneous profit for miners at
different wealth levels, for four different competition levels. Parameters are the same as
Figure 1 except that M takes multiple values.
Hence, the objective for the advanced miner is
sup
βt≥0
E
[∫ T
0
−c1βtdt+ pdN
1
t
]
. (3.1)
As the optimization problem is independent of wealth, any Markov control can be identified
by a function β(t; α¯), i.e., the control only depends on time.
Given α¯ > 0, the maximizer in (3.1) satisfies the first-order condition
−c1 +
p(M + 1)α¯t
D(βt + (M + 1)α¯t)2
= 0,
which yields the best response
β∗(t; α¯) =


− (M + 1)α¯t +
√
p(M + 1)α¯t
c1D
, if α¯t <
p
c1(M + 1)D
,
0, otherwise.
(3.2)
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Figure 5: Bitcoin hash rate distribution among the largest mining pools. The data is
obtained on 06/30/2019 from https://www.blockchain.com/pools.
3.2 The individual miner’s problem
As in Section 2.1, the model for individual miners remains the same except that the
intensity for Nt in (2.1) becomes
λt =
αt
D(αt +Mα¯t + βtt)
,
given the advanced miner’s hash rate βt. Here the denominator consists of both the advanced
miner’s hash rate and the total of individual miners. Hence, the value function defined in
(2.2) depends on both α¯ and α, i.e., v(t0, x; α¯, β).
For a fixed choice of α¯ > 0 and α ≥ 0, the HJB can be written as
∂tv + sup
α∈[0,A(x)]
(
−cα∂xv +
α
D(α +Mα¯t + βt)
∆v
)
= 0,
with terminal condition v(T, x) = U(x). Like Lemma 2.1, it can be proved that v is strictly
increasing in x. Hence, the maximizer is taken as
α∗(t, x; α¯, β) =


− (Mα¯t + βt) +
√
(Mα¯t + βt)∆v
Dc∂xv
, if Mα¯t + βt <
∆v
Dc∂xv
,
0, otherwise.
(3.3)
If A(x) is sufficiently large, the HJB is simplified as

∂tv +

√c(Mα¯t + βt)∂xv −
√
∆v
D


2
= 0, if Mα¯t + βt <
∆v
Dc∂xv
,
∂tv = 0, otherwise.
(3.4)
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3.3 Equilibrium characterization
Letm(t, x; α¯, β) be the resulting density, corresponding to the optimal hash rate α∗(t, x; α¯, β)
of individual miners. We say that α¯∗ and β∗ form an equilibrium of the mining game with
an advanced miner if
α¯∗t =
∫
R
α∗(t, x; α¯∗, β∗)m(t, x; α¯∗, β∗)dx, ∀t ∈ [t0, T ],
and β∗t = β
∗(t; α¯∗), given by (3.2). Henceforth, let α¯∗ and β∗ denote the equilibrium
mean hash rate and equilibrium hash rate for the advanced miner, v(t, x) = v(t, x; α¯∗, β∗),
α∗(t, x) = α∗(t, x; α¯∗, β∗), and m(t, x) = m(t, x; α¯∗, β∗).
By the same argument presented in Section 2.1.2, it is meaningful to consider α¯∗t > 0 for
all t. And we also assume the initial density satisfies (2.6). Thus in the equilibrium, if A(x)
is sufficiently large, we have coupled equations β∗t = β
∗(t; α¯∗) and
α¯∗t = −η(t)(Mα¯
∗
t + β
∗
t ) +
√
(Mα¯∗t + β
∗
t )
∫
Et
√√√√ ∆v(t, x)
Dc∂xv(t, x)
m(t, x)dx,
by integrating (3.3) on x over the set (2.7). The Fokker-Planck equation is given by
∂tm−∂x(cα
∗(t, x)m)−
1
D
(
α∗(t, x− p)
α∗(t, x− p) +Mα¯∗t + β
∗
t
m(t, x− p)−
α∗(t, x)
α∗(t, x) +Mα¯∗t + β
∗
t
m(t, x)
)
= 0,
with initial distribution m(t0, x) = m0(x).
3.4 Exponential utility and mining without liquidity constraints
In the absence of liquidity constraints and with exponential utility, we have the following
lemma.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose the individual miners have exponential utility u = − 1
γ
e−γx and
no liquidity constraints A(·) ≡ ∞, suppose the relative cost efficiency satisfies
kc <
γp
1− e−γp
M + 1
M
, (3.5)
and let
κ1 =
1− e−γp
Dcγ
, κ2 =
(M + 1)p
Dc1
.
Then, in equilibrium, all miners are active with
α∗(t, x) ≡ α¯∗t ≡
κ21κ2
(κ1 + κ2)2
> 0, β∗t ≡
κ1κ2(κ2 −Mκ1)
(κ1 + κ2)2
> 0, (3.6)
for all t ∈ [t0, T ] and x ∈ R.
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Proof. We consider the ansatz v(t, x) = u(x)h(t) and then the HJB (3.4) becomes


∂th− γ
(√
c(Mα¯∗t + β
∗
t )−
√
1− e−γp
Dγ
)2
h = 0, if Mα¯∗t + β
∗
t <
1− e−γp
Dcγ
,
∂th = 0, otherwise,
with terminal condition h(T ) = 1. Since α¯∗ and β∗ are only functions of t, this validates the
ansatz. In looking for an equilibrium in which α∗t > 0 and β
∗
t > 0, we use the non-zero best
response β∗ in (3.2), and, using the ansatz in (3.3),
α∗(t, x; α¯∗, β∗) = −(Mα¯∗t + β
∗
t ) +
√
1− e−γp
Dcγ
(Mα¯∗t + β
∗
t ).
Since α∗ does not depend on the wealth x, all individual miners are active. Therefore,
we have
α¯∗t = α
∗
t ≡ −(Mα¯
∗
t + β
∗
t ) +
√
1− e−γp
Dcγ
(Mα¯∗t + β
∗
t ).
This, together with (3.2), yields (3.6). It is direct that α∗ is positive, and β∗ is positive if
and only if (3.5) holds. Thus we have found the equilibrium in which everyone is active.
Cost advantage and its effect on mining power concentration
Proposition 3.1 demonstrates that the cost-advantaged miner’s efficiency leads to central-
ization in the following sense. It can be checked that the hash rate β∗t in (3.6) is increasing
in κ2 and hence decreasing in c1. Similarly, the hash rate α
∗ in (3.6) of the individual miners
increases with respect to c1. Thus, a smaller c1—a bigger cost advantage—makes the ad-
vanced miner more dominant. As a consequence, individual miners with higher cost have to
decrease their hash rates to regulate their risk exposure, as the advanced miner gets a larger
share of the mining rewards.
To quantify this, consider the case that γ ≪ p, so that also the individual miners are
(almost) risk neutral. To understand the share of the reward obtained by the advanced miner,
we write
kc = ρ
γp
1− e−γp
≈ ρ
for some constant 0 < ρ ≤ 1. Then κ2 = (M + 1)κ1/ρ. The probability for the advanced
miner to get the reward is
β∗
β∗ + (M + 1)α¯∗
=
κ2 −Mκ1
κ1 + κ2
=
(1− ρ)M + 1
M + 1 + ρ
≈ 1− ρ
for sufficient large M , whereas the remaining miners have a collective probability ρ and
individual probability ρ/(M + 1). If the advanced miner is 10% efficient (kc = 0.9), then
ρ ≤ 0.9, which gives a probability around 10% for the advanced miner to get the reward.
Let Y and Y 1 denote the profits of the individual miner and the advanced miner. Then
we have
Yt0+t = −cα
∗t+ pN∗t , Y
1
t0+t
= −c1α
∗
1t+ pN
1∗
t ,
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Figure 6: The distribution of miners’ wealth at t = 0, 30, 45. For both figures, kc = 0.8.
The parameters are the same as Figure 1.
where N∗t and N
1∗
t have jump rates
ρ
D(M+1+ρ)
and (1−ρ)M+1
D(M+1+ρ)
. We can then get the expectation
and variance.
E(Y 1t0+t) =
p
D
(
(1− ρ)M + 1
M + 1 + ρ
)2
t, E(Yt0+t) =
(
p−
M + 1
M + 1 + ρ
1− e−γp
γ
)
ρt
D(M + 1 + ρ)
,
Var(Y 1t0+t) =
p2((1− ρ)M + 1)
D(M + 1 + ρ)
t, Var(Yt0+t) =
p2ρt
D(M + 1 + ρ)
.
Notice that c1 is increasing in ρ. Hence, E(Yt0+t) and Var(Yt0+t) are increasing in c1 while
E(Y 1t0+t) and Var(Y
1
t0+t) are decreasing in c1. Combining with the analysis before, the ad-
vanced miner hashes harder to have more expected profits and more risk at the same time.
However, individual miners facing the competition from the advanced miner have to decrease
their hash rates and thus receive less profits. Meanwhile, the risk they are faced with is lower.
3.5 Liquidity-constrained mining and power utility
In this section, we assume individual miners take liquidity constraints into consideration
and compete with the advanced miner. The model for the individual miners is described in
Section 2.3. We use power utility (2.14) in our numerical results. The HJB and the Fokker–
Planck equations of Sections 3.2 and 3.3 are modified like in Section 2.3. We omit the details
for brevity. The numerical method correspondingly follows the procedure in Section 2.3.1
with appropriate updates.
Figure 6 shows the wealth distribution of individual miners when kc = 0.8 for t = 0, 30, 45.
The change from Figure 1 is not immediately apparent, but there are two subtle differences.
Most clearly visible is the larger portion of individuals who are in the region of optimal zero
rate mining. This shift can be attributed to the upward shift of this cutoff. The other effect
is the slightly slower dispersion of the distribution, which is explained by the hesitancy in
the region right above the cutoff.
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Figure 7: Effect of cost efficiency, kc. The first shows the advantaged miner’s proba-
bility of getting the next reward, i.e., the expected share of total rewards. The last one
shows the advantaged miner’s expected instantaneous profits divided by the total instan-
taneous profits of all miners. For both figures, t = 30. The parameters are the same as
Figure 1.
The effect of varying the cost efficiency kc is plotted in Figure 7. Figure 7(a) shows
the advantaged miner’s probability of getting the next reward, which is also the share of the
expected instantaneous reward. As it is more cost efficient from kc = 1.0 to 0.65, its hash rate
accounts for around 1% to 35%. Hence, the cost advantages could be one explanatory factor
for the concentration of mining power. A similar idea also appears in (Arnosti and Weinberg,
2018). They suggest that if a miner’s cost is (e.g.) 10% lower than those of other miners,
then the miner must control at least 10% of the total mining power. Alsabah and Capponi
(2019) argue that miners invest in R&D which allows them to develop more energy efficient
mining equipment. Hence miners can have lower marginal cost and contribute more hash
rates. As M = 1000, the advantaged miner contributes a somewhat higher hash rate than
the rest of the population—which is on the order of 1/M—even for kc = 1. We attribute
this to the difference in risk aversion, as these numbers are for γ = 0.8.
Figure 7(b) plots the share of total profits for the advantaged miner. At a 35% cost
advantage, i.e., kc = 0.65, the advantaged miner reaps 93% of the total profits generated,
and 86% of profits for kc = 0.75. This shows that most of the economic welfare in the system
is received by a miner with a cost advantage.
As an example of dominant mining, Bitmain controls AntPool and BTC.com which ac-
count for around 33% of the total hash rate in the world as of June 2019 (see Figure 5).
This number includes Bitmain’s computational power as well as those miners who join the
pools. Until Bitmain began to disclose its hash rate in 2018, it was not known how much
Bitmain itself contributed. According to Bitmain,6 it had 2339.21 PH/s on Bitcoin mining
in October 2018. A rough estimate of the total hash rate at that time was 50000 PH/s on
6https://web.archive.org/web/20181017133438/https://blog.bitmain.com/en/
hashrate-disclosure/
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BTC.com website.7 Thus, Bitmain accounted for about 4.5% of all computational power for
Bitcoin mining. As already mentioned, it has access to cheaper electricity, which enables it
to contribute significant large hash rate.
Moreover, Taylor (2017) points out that some mining entities develop application-specific
integrated circuits (ASICs) and create related data centers with low energy cost. For instance,
BitFury takes advantage of ASICs, which convert the same amount of electricity into more
hash rates. “BitFury optimizes its chips for use in new immersion-cooled datacenters in the
Republic of Georgia, Iceland, and Finland”. Thus, more advanced equipment also helps the
advanced miner acquire a big share of the mining market.
4 Conclusion
This paper develops models to study the centralization of the reward and computational
power in Bitcoin mining. The mean field game among a continuum of miners is explored.
As a result of the heterogeneity of the miners’ wealth, more rewards tend to be collected by
those who have more wealth, which is “the rich get richer”. Since miners are maximizing
their own utility, the rich will contribute more hash rates to compete for the reward and
hence have higher probability of receiving the next reward. Moreover, the price of bitcoin
fosters this phenomenon, since higher price means more reward and more incentive to hash.
However, the competition will reduce this phenomenon, because the probability of getting
the next reward becomes smaller for each miner. In addition, we incorporate an advanced
miner into the game to study the centralization of the computational power. The result
shows that if a miner is cost efficient, then it will contribute a significant amount of hash
rate in the game. This explains that mining pools that have more advanced equipment or
access to cheaper electricity account for most of the computational power in recent years.
Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. For the finiteness, by Jensen’s inequality,
E[u(XT )|Xt = x] ≤ u(E[XT |Xt = x]) ≤ u(x+ pE[NT −Nt]) ≤ u
(
x+
pT
D
)
<∞.
For any x1 < x2, let α
i
t and X
i
t (i = 1, 2) denote the optimal hash rate and corresponding
wealth starting at time t with initial wealth xi. Consider the case where we start with x2.
We use x1 as the wealth in the mining and save x2 − x1 in a bank account. Then we use
the hash rate α1t . The corresponding wealth process is denoted by X
2,1
t . Thus we have
X2,1t ≥ x2 − x1 +X
1
t > X
1
t . Thus,
v(t, x1) < E[u(X
2,1
T )|X
2,1
t = x2] ≤ v(t, x2).
7https://btc.com/stats/diff
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.4
Proof. For any ε > 0,
v(ε)− v(0)
ε
≥
U(ε)− U(0)
ε
ε→0
−−→ ∞.
Hence, by continuity, ∆v/∂xv is arbitrarily small in some neighborhood of 0. Thus, by (2.4),
there exists a xb(t) such that zero rate mining is optimal for x ≤ xb.
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